Parliamentary elections were held in Moldova on 28 September 2025. Moldova is a parliamentary republic; the Parliament of Moldova has the main authority of creating laws and appointing the government, and executive powers are primarily derived from the legislature. The main parties and coalitions contesting the election were the ruling pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the pro-Russian Patriotic Electoral Bloc (BEP), the centre-left and nominally pro-European Alternative (BA), and the left-wing populist and mildly pro-Russian Our Party (PN).

The election was described as potentially determining the fate of Moldova's accession bid into the European Union (EU), with President Maia Sandu calling it "the most important election in the history of the country". Reports both from the Moldovan authorities and national and international media outlets described Russian electoral interference, which included disinformation and manipulation campaigns, plans for protests and unrest, cyberattacks and vote buying. Two pro-Russian parties, the Heart of Moldova Party (PRIM, part of the Patriotic Bloc) and the Greater Moldova Party (PMM), were banned from running two days before the election following allegations of illegal financing linked to Russia.

The election was declared valid at 14:28 EEST (UTC+03:00) after voter turnout surpassed the 33.3% minimum required by law, with the election reaching a final turnout of 52.21%. PAS won just over 50% of the vote and 55 seats, retaining a reduced majority government; the Patriotic Bloc suffered modest losses (compared to the Bloc of Communists and Socialists in the 2021 election), while Alternative, PN, and the populist and unionist (pro-unification with Romania) Democracy at Home Party (PPDA) entered parliament for the first time. The entry of PPDA was regarded as a surprise due to its pre-election polling numbers being invariably below the electoral threshold.

Background

The 2021 Moldovan parliamentary election resulted in a landslide victory for the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), a pro-European party led by President Maia Sandu. PAS secured 63 out of 101 seats, allowing it to form a single-party majority government. The election marked a significant shift towards European integration, as PAS defeated the Bloc of Communists and Socialists, a pro-Russian electoral alliance.

After coming to power, the PAS government pursued anti-corruption measures, judicial reforms, and European Union integration. Pro-Russian opposition forces organized protests against the government amid Moldova's economic problems; the protests were partly financed with money from Russia according to Moldova's Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (PA).

In the 2024 Moldovan presidential election, Sandu was re-elected with 55.3% of the vote, defeating pro-Russian candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. The election was overshadowed by Russian interference, also featuring misuse of public resources by the government and unbalanced media coverage in Sandu's favour, and it took place at the same time as a referendum on EU integration, which narrowly passed with 50.4% support. Viorel Cernăuțeanu, the head of the Moldovan Police, stated that dozens of millions of US dollars had been transferred to a total of over 138,000 people in Moldova, about 10% of the active electorate, through the Russian bank Promsvyazbank in order to "massively corrupt the electorate" of the presidential election and referendum, with the number of people benefitting from this system reportedly being much greater as recipients were also given money for their family members. As a result of Russian interference and vote buying, the outcome of both votes was influenced, with the EU referendum passing only narrowly.

In January 2025, an energy crisis erupted in Moldova as Russia halted natural gas supplies to Moldova's Russia-backed unrecognized breakaway region of Transnistria. Sandu and the Moldovan authorities accused Russia of causing the crisis to influence the upcoming parliamentary election, with several foreign analysts and think tanks supporting this view, arguing that the crisis could undermine the popularity of PAS and Moldova's path towards Europe and lead to pro-Russian parties regaining power.

According to Moldovan think tank WatchDog, PAS completed around 56% of its 2021 promises during its four years in government. According to the German Marshall Fund, PAS has been criticized for limiting opportunities for other pro-EU parties. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argued that the "pro-Russian" label had been increasingly instrumentalized against the opposition during pro-government mobilization for the 2025 election, and stated that "Western-funded civil society" had increasingly become an extension of governmental capacity. An International Press Institute survey among Moldovan media representatives found that their biggest worry was Russian disinformation and propaganda, with some respondents also reporting worry about self-censorship in outlets closely aligned editorially with the government's stances on European integration and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in a reported "sort of symbiosis" existing between some of these outlets and the government. Further, the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 during Sandu's first term, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which triggered an economic setback and a massive influx of refugees, the 2025 energy crisis, high inflation and reform fatigue reduced PAS' popularity. Amidst Russian interference and disinformation campaigns, Euronews described the election as being for Sandu "a final battle" on Moldova's road to EU membership.

Electoral system The 101 members of the Parliament are elected by party-list proportional representation on a nationwide closed list. The electoral threshold at the national level varies according to the type of list; for parties or individual organizations it is 5%; for an electoral bloc it is 7%. For independent candidates, the threshold is 2%. Moldova is a parliamentary republic, with the Parliament having the main authority of creating laws and appointing the government and executive powers being primarily derived from the legislature.

Campaign Prelude and bloc formations On 31 January, Moldovan opposition leader Alexandr Stoianoglo, who lost the 2024 presidential election to President Sandu, announced the formation of a new coalition to challenge the pro-Western ruling majority. The coalition, called Alternative, unites three political parties led by Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, and former lawmaker Mark Tkachuk. While Stoianoglo campaigned on a foreign policy that included both Russia and the West, he had leaned toward Russia, with his past presidential candidacy backed by the pro-Moscow Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova (PSRM).

In 2023, the National Alternative Movement (MAN) and the European Social Democratic Party (PSDE) started talks for a merger which fell apart in the prelude of the 2024 presidential election. Tudor Ulianovschi claimed that PSDE was not invited into the MAN's Alternative coalition. In May, former PDM leader Dumitru Diacov called for a merger of PSDE and Marian Lupu's Respect Moldova Movement (MRM). In July, PSDE proposed a "European Moldova Alliance" with the Coalition for Unity and Welfare (CUB) and the League of Cities and Communes (LOC), both former members of the Together bloc. In August, Boris Foca announced that the Modern Democratic Party (PDMM) will compete and called former PDM members to join. Diacov also reiterated his call for a merger of PSDE, MRM, and PDMM.

On 4 June 2025, the For Moldova Platform was formed aiming to unite the opposition parties and later received support from the PSRM, the Party of Communists and Future of Moldova Party. On 10 June, George Simion, leader of the party Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) in Romania, called on Moldovans to vote in the election to "take revenge" and "defeat politically" Sandu. At the 2025 Romanian presidential election, in the second round, Sandu and PAS had supported Simion's opponent, Nicușor Dan, who won the election. On 4 July, Igor Dodon announced negotiations for a left-wing bloc. Vladimir Voronin later confirmed that the bloc would include the PSRM, PCRM, Heart of Moldova Party and the Future of Moldova Party. The Patriotic Electoral Bloc was registered on 3 August without the PCRM, which joined five days later. The Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (PLDM), led by Vlad Filat, submitted its registration application for the election on 15 July, one day after the deadline. The PLDM's appeal was rejected by the Supreme Court of Justice (CSJ) on 2 September, so the party was excluded from the race.

In a 6 July 2025 congress of the Victory bloc held in Moscow in Russia, the bloc's leader, Moldovan fugitive oligarch Ilan Shor, stated that he wanted Evghenia Guțul, Governor of Gagauzia, to head Victory's electoral list for the 2025 parliamentary election. At the moment, Guțul was being investigated for two criminal cases and was under house arrest. Shor also stated at the same congress that he believed "the only salvation" for Moldova was "union with the Russian Federation" and that "it makes no sense to talk about the country's independence", adding the comment "one currency, one parliament". On 5 August 2025, just weeks before the election, Guțul was sentenced to seven years in prison for using undeclared Russian funds to finance political activities. In July, the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) cancelled Victory's registration. After its cancellation, the members decided to register separately but on the next day (3 August), Chance, FASM and Victory (as well as non-member Agrarian Party of Moldova) were barred too. The Ministry of Justice announced that it sought to dissolve said parties alongside also Victory bloc member Revival Party. On 15 August, Revival was barred from running too.

On 20 August, PCRM leader Voronin commented on the so-called "kuliok" (black bag) case, stating that his coalition partner PSRM leader Dodon received 860,000 euros from Vladimir Plahotniuc and that he had already testified before the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. In the case, Dodon was accused of passive corruption and of organizing and accepting funding for a political party from a criminal organization. According to the charges, Dodon accepted money from then PDM leader and later fugitive oligarch Plahotniuc in 2019 to fund the PSRM. Voronin withdrew his statements a day later, calling them a sarcastic joke. Voronin had criticized Dodon many times in the past, considering him a "traitor" for having left the PCRM in 2011 and having divided the PCRM's voters with the PSRM. At the time, Voronin only held the 49th place on the Patriotic Bloc's list of candidates, which Dodon headed, having little chances of entering the parliament, although Voronin stated there was an agreement within the bloc to promote him to 32nd place. According to Moldovan journalist and Nokta founder Mihail Sirkeli, his low place on the list would have humiliated Voronin, with Sirkeli suggesting Voronin could have made the statements about the kuliok case either to sabotage the bloc or as a personal maneuver to secure a safe position on its list.