1966 Ghanaian coup d'état

The 1966 Ghanaian coup d'état (codenamed Operation Cold Chop) was a military overthrow of President Kwame Nkrumah on February 24, 1966, while he was visiting China. The swift coup led to the establishment of an eight-member National Liberation Council (NLC), comprising four army and four police officers. The NLC dissolved Nkrumah's Convention People's Party and the Parliament, and suspended the constitution.

Political climate From 1951 to 1966, Ghana was controlled by the Convention People's Party and its founder Kwame Nkrumah. During the 1950s, the CPP sponsored a variety of popular economic projects and in the process created a large foreign debt. In 1960, the CPP moved to nationalize the Ghanaian economy and heavily tightened its control in areas such as currency and taxation. By 1963, the public was suffering from shortages and price gouging. Fewer and fewer businesspeople benefited from party membership. Amidst growing unpopularity, the Party increased its repression of political opponents.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 34–37. "At both the local and national level, tight groups or party favorites commanded access to market stalls, publicly financed housing, GNTC supplies and Government contracts. The effect of this was the encouragement of massive corruption in which the President and top party men participated. Both ordinary party businessmen and non-party businessmen could secure needed resources only at a price. This transition of the CPP from an open politico-economic machine, dispensing economic favours in return for support, to the instrument of an avaricious elite concerned only with maximizing its privileges and defending at all cost its monopoloy of power, was particularly responsible for alienating the rank and file of the party who had associated with CPP with their modest economic demands." It used the Preventive Detention Act to jail its opponents without trial for up to five years. In 1964, Nkrumah won a heavily rigged referendum that made the CPP the sole legal party, with himself as president for life of both nation and party.Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 84. Press freedom reached a low ebb, as evidenced in an October 1965 statement by the Ghanaian Times: "Our socialist society cannot, and would not, tolerate the publication of any newspaper in Ghana which departs from the ideology and loyalties demanded from the press in socialist and Nkrumaist Ghana."Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 202. General Afrifa later commented, regarding Radio Ghana: "From early morning till late at night there poured forth a sickening stream of Stalinist adulation and abject flattery. News was so often distorted or suppressed that Ghanaians stopped believing what they heard."Last, "Ghana's Mass Media" (1980), p. 203.

The Party acted as a political monolith, with functional control over powerful civil organizations such as the Ghana Trades Union Congress and Ghana Muslim Council.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 17. Thus, the CPP had centralized political and economic power in order to pursue rapid industrialization under national control.Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), p. 17.

Behind the scenes was an elite group of economic planners which stood to advance its agenda under military rule.Hutchful, The IMF and Ghana (1987), pp. 16–17. "Thus, while 'socialism' was anti-imperialist, non-capitalist and populist, the welfare state was pro-imperialist, capitalist in orientation and frankly anti-mass. Nevertheless, both 'socialism' and 'welfare state' had their antecedents in the CPP. Officially 'welfare state' ideology had been transcended in faovr of 'socialism'; in reality it was alive and well in the state planning organs and important sectors of the CPP. By and large the planners who were the architects of the 'Seven-Year Development Plan' were also the draughtsmen of the 'Economic Policy' of the military government. The immediate genesis of the coup would thus appear to be the policy differences within the party leadership itself". These technocrats within the government found common cause with the military and police in their disdain for the mass politics of the Convention People's Party.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 96–97. "Like the intelligentsia, the political prospectives of the officers are pervaded by a dislike of political parties, professional politicians, and 'mass' politics. This is particularly apparent in the officers' analysis of the struggle for independence, which transferred power from the British not to the intelligensia politicians as contemplated but to the CPP." One such figure was B. A. Bentum, former Secretary-General of the Agricultural Workers Union and subsequently the Minister of Forestry under the CPP. Bentum disapproved of the country's socialist tendencies and collaborated with the plotters by supplying them with information (including details about secret Chinese training camps, being used to train revolutionaries from other African countries). Kojo Botsio, chairman of the State Planning Commission, was similarly disposed if not as closely involved.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 131.

Military and police dissatisfaction Nkrumah faulted the police for allowing an attempted bombing against him in 1962. When on 2 January 1964, a police officer shot at Nkrumah and killed his bodyguard, the Police Force was reorganized from above, eight top officers were dismissed, and the rank and file were disarmed.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), p. 95. Subsequently, in April 1965, the Police Service Act gave Nkrumah direct authority to hire and fire police.Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 82. Nkrumah also removed the "Special Branch" intelligence service from the police force and brought it under civilian control.

Police Commissioner John Harlley and his second-in-command Anthony Deku had long aspired to take control of the government.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 119–121. "These two police officers had conceived a coup against the CPP as far back as 1963. Their position as officers in charge of the Special Branch, the country's largest and most reputable security agency, could permit them to achieve swiftly and in absolute secrecy two vital targets of the conspiracy: information about the regime, and linkage with actual or potential sympathizers." Harlley had compiled a large dossier on corruption within the CPP and used these files to gain legitimacy for his cause.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 126. To take over the country, however, the Police Force had to work with the military—not only because they had been disarmed, but also because, as the primary executors of repression and brutality under the CPP, they did not enjoy a good reputation with the general public.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 121–122. "Police had been used to arrest prominent members of the United Party and politicians opposed to Nkrumah, who were subsequently detained without trail, and they had been employed by the notorious District Commissioners for the arbitrary arrests of local opposition figures. The security activities of the Special Branch and the C.I.D. were regarded with considerable dread. [...] Such was the dislike and contempt for the Police that there was never any doubt that a coup by the Police would fail to win popular support. Secondly, following the attempted assassination of President Nkrumah in January 1964 by a police constable, the entire Police Force in the country was disarmed."

Coup planners from the military identified mistreatment of the armed forces, and preferential treatment of the President's Own Guard Regiment, as sources of their dissatisfaction.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), pp. 1–2. "Writing a book on the coup d'état some months after it had occurred, General Afrifa, one of its principal architects, devoted a chapter to the plight of the Ghanaian soldier, in which he described the better pay and equipment enjoyed by the President's Own Guard Regiment in comparison with the regular army, and the way in which Major General Otu, the most senior officer, was often by-passed by his subordinates in advising the president. The dismissal of Generals Ankrah and Otu was said to be a 'major reason' for the coup." The salaries of soldiers and officers, set in 1957, had lost much of their value amidst general inflation, and the army did not have money for new uniforms and equipment.Pinkney, Ghana Under Military Rule (1972), p. 2. [Quoting from General Ocran's memoirs] "The commanders were hard put to it. They had known and been accustomed to a high standard of turnout and cleanliness. What, then, could they do to soldiers who turned out on parade in torn uniforms, with the underwear showing underneath their shorts or trousters? Soldiers with no polish or shine on their boots or with their toes showing through their canvas shoes? By late 1965, the going was getting tough for most senior officers. The salaries introduced in 1957 meant little in 1965. They were worth only a third of their value."

Some key figures of the coup had come into personal conflict with Nkrumah. Otu, the Chief of Defense Staff, and Ankrah, the Deputy Chief, had been fired in August 1965 and replaced with officers considered more loyal. The generals later claimed that actions such as these represented an overreach of civilian power over the military.Hutchful, "Military Rule and the Politics of Demilitarization" (1973), pp. 90–91. Afrifa was facing a court-martial for insubordination, to begin on 25 February 1966.Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), p. 145. " Afrifa was to be court-marshaled for in-subordination after he had ordered troops under him to return to barracks when they were to be used in a special operation ordered by the Head of military Intelligence Brigadier Hassan to arrest certain civilians in the second largest city Kumasi. This refusal to obey military orders on the part of Afrifa was reported to the Deputy Chief of Defense Staff General Barwah and on February 25, 1966 Afrifa was to be court-marshaled." Harlley and Deku were accused of involvement in a newly exposed scheme to illicitly sell diamonds to a European dealer—according to rumour, Nkrumah would have arrested them upon return to the country.Biney, "Nkrumah's Political Thought in Exile" (2009), p. 82. "Adding to this deep-seated disenchantment with Nkrumah, in December 1965 the president had ordered an enquiry into diamond smuggling operations involving a European diamond dealer and a number of Ghanaians. Both Harlley and Deku were implicated in the scandal. It was rumoured—days before the coup—that on Nkrumah's return from Vietnam, he would have arrested his police chiefs for complicity in the scandal. The execution of the coup enabled Harlley and Deku to evade exposure and possible incarceration."Al-Hassan, "Politicized Soldiers" (2004), pp. 144–145.