The Battle of Halbe (, Battle of the Halbe Pocket; , Halbe pocket) was a battle lasting from April 24 to May 1, 1945, in which the German Ninth Army under the command of General Theodor Busse was destroyed as a fighting force by the advancing Red Army during the Battle of Berlin.
The Ninth Army, encircled in a large pocket in the Spree Forest region south-east of Berlin, attempted to break out westwards through the village of Halbe and the pine forests south of Berlin to link up with the German Twelfth Army commanded by General Walther Wenck with the intention of heading west and surrendering to the Western Allies. To do this, the Ninth Army had to fight its way through three lines of Soviet troops of the 1st Ukrainian Front under the command of Marshal Ivan Konev, while at the same time units of the 1st Belorussian Front, under the command of Marshal Georgy Zhukov, attacked the German rearguard from the northeast.
After heavy fighting, about 30,000 German soldiers—just over one third of those originally in the pocket—reached the comparative safety of the Twelfth Army's front lines. The rest were either killed or captured by Soviet forces.
Prelude On April 16, the Red Army started the Battle of Berlin with a three Front attack across the Oder-Neisse line. By April 21, it had broken through the German front line in two places and had started to surround Berlin. The German Ninth Army covered the defenses of the Seelow Heights against Marshal Zhukov's 1st Belorussian Front, but its position was unhinged by the successful attack of Marshal Ivan Konev's 1st Ukrainian Front (against Army Group Centre) on the Neisse. By April 20, the Ninth Army retreated south-east of Berlin, opening the way for the 1st Belorussian Front.
Because of the high speed of the advance of Konev's forces, the Ninth Army was now threatened with envelopment by the two Soviet pincers that were heading for Berlin from the south and east. The southern pincer consisted of the 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies which had penetrated the furthest and had already cut through the area behind the Ninth Army's front lines.
Encirclement
German dispositions
The command of the V SS Mountain Corps, encircled with the Ninth Army north of Forst, passed from the 4th Panzer Army (part of Army Group Centre) to the Ninth Army (part of Army Group Vistula under the command of Colonel-General Gotthard Heinrici). The corps was still holding on to Cottbus. While the bulk of Army Group Centre was being forced, by the advance of the 1st Ukrainian Front, to retreat along its lines of communication to the south-west towards Czechoslovakia, the southern flank of the 4th Panzer Army had some local successes counterattacking north against the 1st Ukrainian Front.
Contrary to realities on the ground, Hitler ordered the Ninth Army to hold Cottbus and set up a front facing west, then they were to attack into the Soviet columns advancing north. This would allow them to form the northern pincer which would meet with the 4th Panzer Army coming from the south and envelop the 1st Ukrainian Front before destroying it. They were to anticipate an attack south by the 3rd Panzer Army and to be ready to be the southern arm of a pincer attack which would envelop the 1st Belorussian Front, which would then be destroyed by SS-general Felix Steiner's III SS Panzer Corps advancing from the north of Berlin. Later in the day, Steiner made it plain that he did not have the divisions to make this effort. Heinrici then explained to Hitler's staff that unless the Ninth Army retreated immediately, it would be enveloped by the Soviet forces. He stressed it was already too late for the unit to move north-west to Berlin and would have to retreat west.
At his afternoon situation conference on April 22, Hitler flew into a rage when he realised that his plans of the day before were not going to be implemented. He declared that the war was lost, blamed the generals and announced that he would stay in Berlin until the end and then kill himself. In an attempt to coax Hitler out of his rage, the Chief of Staff of the OKW, Colonel-General Alfred Jodl, speculated that the 12th Army, which was facing the American forces, could move to Berlin because the Americans already on the Elbe River were unlikely to move further east. Hitler immediately seized upon the idea and within hours, the army's commander, General Walther Wenck, was ordered to disengage from the American forces and move the Twelfth Army north-east to support Berlin. It was then realised that if the Ninth Army moved west, it could link up with the Twelfth Army. In the evening, Heinrici was given permission to make the linkup.
Although in Hitler's mind the Twelfth Army was going to break through to Berlin, and the Ninth Army, once it had broken through to the Twelfth Army, was going to help them, there is no evidence that Generals Heinrici, Busse or Wenck thought that this was at all possible. However, Hitler's agreement to allow the Ninth Army to break through to the Twelfth Army would allow a window through which sizable numbers of German troops could retreat to the west and surrender to the American forces, which is exactly what Wenck and Busse agreed to do. This was made easier when, shortly after midnight on April 25, Busse was given authority "to decide for himself the best direction of attack".
The situation of the German 9th Army Before being encircled, the Ninth Army had already suffered heavy losses in the Battle of the Seelow Heights. It is estimated that, at the start of the encirclement, it had fewer than 1,000 guns and mortars, approximately 79 tanks, and probably a total of 150–200 combat-ready armoured fighting vehicles left. In all, there were about 80,000 men in the pocket, the majority of whom belonged to the Ninth Army, consisting of the XI SS Panzer Corps, V SS Mountain Corps and the newly acquired V Army Corps, but there was also the Frankfurt Garrison. The number of tanks reported included 36 tanks in the XI SS Panzer Corps, including up to 14 Tiger II tanks of the 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion. Air supply was attempted on April 25 and 26, but could not be carried out because the planes that had taken off could not find the drop point for supply, and no contact with the encircled army could be established.
The pocket into which the Ninth Army had been pushed by troops of the 1st Belorussian and 1st Ukrainian Fronts was a region of lakes and forest in the Spree Forest south-east of Fürstenwalde. The Soviet forces, having broken through and surrounded their primary objective of Berlin, then turned to mopping up those forces in the pocket. On the afternoon of April 25, the Soviet 3rd, 33rd and 69th Armies, as well as the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps (which was a formation capable of infiltration through difficult terrain such as forests), attacked the pocket from the north-east as ordered by Marshal Georgy Zhukov, the commander of the 1st Belorussian Front. Konev knew that to break out to the west, the Ninth Army would have to cross the Berlin–Dresden Autobahn south of a chain of lakes starting at Teupitz and running north-east. On the same day of his attack in the north-east, Zhukov sent the 3rd Guards Army to support the 28th Army, which was ready to close the likely breakout route over the Berlin–Dresden Autobahn.
Soviet dispositions
Soviet forces ordered to attack the Ninth Army numbered around 280,000 men, 7,400 guns and mortars, 280 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,500 aircraft. The force included six Air Corps and the 1st Guards Breakthrough Artillery Division, which was committed on April 25.
In the area to the west of the encirclement, Soviet forces were already positioned in depth, with (from the north)
the 28th Army's 128th Rifle Corps in the area of Mittenwalde and Motzen. the 3rd Guards Rifle Corps in the area of Tornow, Radeland, Baruth/Mark, Golssen. the 3rd Guards Army's 120th Rifle Corps south of Halbe. the 21st Rifle Corps along the Berlin to Dresden Autobahn 13 to the west of Lübben. the 13th Army's 102nd Rifle Corps with the 117th Guards Rifle Division near Luckenwalde. the 27th Rifle Corps's 280th Rifle Division at Jüterbog, where the Wehrmacht's main artillery school was located. In terms of mechanized formations, the 3rd Guards Tank Army's 9th Mechanised Corps had its 71st Mechanized Brigade between Teupitz and Neuhof; the 4th Guards Tank Army's 68th Guards Tank Brigade stood near Kummersdorf Gut; and the 3rd Guards Army's 25th Tank Corps near Duben. Both the 3rd Guards Army and the 13th Army were to be heavily reinforced throughout the battle, as they were to be in the path of the German break-out. A reinforcement of particular note was the deployment of the 1st Guards Breakthrough Artillery Division under the command of the 3rd Guards Army in the sector of Teurow to Briesen.
Breakout
The Twelfth Army's attack and the Ninth Army's plan The relief attempt by the Twelfth Army started on April 24 with General Wenck's XX Corps attacking east and northwards. During the night, the Theodor Körner RAD Division attacked the Soviet 5th Guards Mechanised Corps, under the command of General I. P. Yermakov, near Treuenbrietzen. The next day, the Scharnhorst Division started to engage the Soviet troops in and around Beelitz and caught the 4th Guards Tank Army's 6th Guards Mechanized Corps' open flank, overrunning rear-area units. While the Ulrich von Hutten Division tried to reach Potsdam, with the Scharnhorst Division on its eastern flank, to open a corridor into Berlin, other elements of the Twelfth Army, as Wenck had agreed with Busse, pushed east to meet the Ninth Army.
In the words of Busse to Wenck, the Ninth Army was planning to push west "like a caterpillar". According to Busse's plan, the Tiger II heavy tanks of the 102nd SS Heavy Panzer Battalion should lead this caterpillar. The metaphor is quite apt because, as the head led the way, the rear-guard in the tail was going to be engaged in just as heavy fighting trying to disengage from following Soviet forces.
On the night of April 25/26, a new order was issued to the Ninth and Twelfth Armies by Hitler. It stipulated that:
The Twelfth Army was to cut off the 4th Guards Tank Army by reaching the line Beelitz to Ferch, and to attack eastwards to unite with the Ninth Army. The Ninth Army was to hold on to its eastern front between Spreewald and Fürstenwalde, and to attack westward to link up with the Twelfth Army. Once both armies were combined, they were to attack northwards and open a corridor through the Red Army's encirclement of Berlin.
The final army conference of the Ninth Army took place at 15:00 on April 28. At this point, contact was lost with the V Corps and the V SS Mountain Corps. The conference found that the only possible break-out route had to lead through Halbe. This was not difficult for the Soviet commanders to deduce as well, while, on the other hand, Ninth Army had virtually no information about the Soviet force dispositions between it and the Twelfth Army. From this conference onward, command and control within the Ninth Army collapsed. There was almost no contact between the Ninth Army headquarters and Army Group Vistula, and little contact with formations under Ninth Army command. There were few or no maps to guide planning or combat operations.